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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
FEDERAL TAX LAW-TAXATION OF INTEREST-FREE LOANS-MA-
JORITY SHAREHOLDER REALIZES INCOME BY RECEIVING INTEREST-
FREE LOANS FROM CLOSELY-HELD CORPORATION. Hardee v. United
States, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9459, at 84,656 (Ct. C1. Tr. Div.
July 6, 1982). The taxpayer maintained interest-free credit lines with
his closely-held corporation, providing promissory notes as evidence of
the loan transactions.' The Commissioner notified the taxpayer of defi-
ciencies resulting from the taxpayer's failure to report the economic
benefit derived from the free use of corporate funds.2 Following pay-
ment, the taxpayer applied for a refund of the deficiencies.' The Court
of Claims denied the refund 4 and held: a shareholder recognizes in-
come from the interest-free use of corporate funds and may not claim
1. Hardee v. United States, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9459, at 84,656 (Ct. Cl. Tr. Div.
July 6, 1982). The plaintiff, William Hardee, began interest-free borrowing from his closely held
Florida corporation, Sea Garden Sales Company, Inc., in the 1950s. During the tax years in
dispute, 1973 and 1974, the balance of Hardee's credit lines fluctuated. On December 31, 1972, he
owed Sea Garden approximately $503,000. On December 31, 1974, his indebtedness to Sea Gar-
den totaled approximately $474,000. Id at 84,656.
2. The Commissioner assessed the values of the economic benefits derived from the interest-
free loans by increasing Hardee's income by seven percent of the amount Hardee owed Sea Gar-
den. Using this formula and applying the marginal tax rate corresponding to Hardee's income,
the Commissioner determined the income and tax deficiencies for the two years. The Commis-
sioner contended that in 1973 the economic benefit of the loans totaled $38,745, and that Hardee
owed additional income taxes of $24,926. In 1974 a tax deficiency of $24,675 resulted from the
$37,775 economic benefit of interest-free loans. Id at 84,657 n.2.
3. Id at 84,657. A taxpayer notified of a deficiency faces five alternatives. First, he may
willingly pay the tax. Second, he may ignore the deficiency notice. If ignored too long, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service will begin collection proceedings. I.R.C. §§ 6301-6365 (1976 & Supp. 1980).
Third, he may petition the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency. I.R.C. § 6214 (1976
& Supp. 1980). Fourth, he may pay the deficiency and, following a denial of a refund from the
Internal Revenue Service, bring suit in federal district court for a refund. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976
& Supp. 1980). Finally, he may pay the deficiency and, following a denial of a refund from the
Internal Revenue Service, bring suit for a refund in the Court of Claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976
& Supp. 1980). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976 & Supp. 1980). See generally Ponder, Trial Court
Litigation-Tax Court, Court of Claims, and District Court: A Practicing Lawyer's Views, 21 MA-
JOR TAX PLAN. 117 (1969).
The structure of the Court of Claims has recently changed by passage of the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2501 (West Supp. 1982). Under the New Act, effec-
tive October 1, 1982, the Trial Division of the Court of Claims is now the United States Claims
Court. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2501 (West Supp. 1982).
4. 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9459, at 84,656, 84,659.
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an imputed interest deduction.5
Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code defines gross income as "all
income from whatever source derived."' 6 Courts, liberally interpreting
the section,7 have included a variety of benefits in the gross incomes of
taxpayers.' Although nonmonetary c6mpensation 9 and the free use of
many corporate assets'0 result in income recognition to an employee or
5. Id
6. I.R.C. § 61 (1976 & Supp. 1980).
7. In Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28 (1949), the Supreme Court stated that courts
should liberally construe section 61. Additionally, the Court has held that the broad language of
section 61 indicates that Congress intended to "tax all gains except those specifically exempted."
James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 219 (1961); Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246
(1956); Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430 (1955). The Court has also stated
that section 61 is "broad enough to include in taxable income any economic benefit conferred on
the employee as compensation, whatever the form or mode by which it is effected." Commissioner
v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177, 181 (1945).
8. See cases cited infra notes 9 & 10 and accompanying text.
9. For cases in which the Court has found nonmonetary compensation taxable income to
the taxpayer, see Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956) (difference in cost of participation
in stock option plan and value of the stock at the time of purchase); Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, 279 U.S. 719 (1929) (payment of corporate officer's tax liability); Dolese v. United
States, 605 F.2d 1146 (10th Cir. 1979) (payment of shareholder's litigation expenses); Commis-
sioner v. Riss, 374 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1967) (automobile); United Anilene Co. v. Commissioner,
316 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1963) (yacht expenses); Rudolph v. United States, 291 F.2d 841 (5th Cir.
1961) (vacation), cer. dismissed 370 U.S. 269 (1962); Patterson v. Thomas, 289 F.2d 108 (5th Cir.
1961) (vacation); Silverman v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1958) (vacation); Greenspun
v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956) (farm expenses); Chester Distrib. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 184 F.2d 514 (3rd Cir. 1950) (entertainment expenses); Oberwinder v. Commissioner, 147
F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1945) (annuity contracts); Commissioner v. Bonwit, 87 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1937)
(life insurance); Canady v. Guitteau, 86 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1936) (same); Yuengling v. Commis-
sioner, 69 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1934) (same); Campbell Sash Works, Inc. v. United States, 217 F.
Supp. 74 (N.D. Ohio 1963) (vacation); Creel v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1173 (1979) (interest obli-
gations), afd sub nom. Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981); Hanhauser v.
Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1851-67 (1976) (maintenance of shareholder's mistress); Gen-
shaft v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 282 (1975) (life insurance); Champion Trophy Mfg. Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 1236 (1972) (personal expenses); Conole v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M.
(CCH) 467 (1971) (vacation), aj7'd, 473 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir. 1973); Cambridge Hotels, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 1411 (1968) (personal expenses); Hornung v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.
428 (1967) (automobile); Adams v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 381 (1929) (life insurance).
Similarly, the Treasury Regulations provide that if services are paid for other than in money,
the fair market value of the property or services taken in payment must be included in income.
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (1981).
10. See, e.g., Gardner v. Commissioner, 613 F.2d 160 (6th Cir. 1980) (automobile); Commis-
sioner v. Anderson, 371 F.2d 59 (6th Cir. 1966) (house); Walker v. Commissioner, 362 F.2d 140
(7th Cir. 1966) (same); Dole v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d 308 (Ist Cir. 1965) (same); Atlanta
Biltmore Hotel Corp. v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1965) (same); United Aniline Co. v.
Commissioner, 316 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1963) (yacht); Dean v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 1019 (3d
Cir. 1951) (house); Finney v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 938 (1980) (houseboat); Harbor
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shareholder, the benefit received from the free use of corporate funds
has historically escaped taxation."
Medical Corp. v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1144 (1979) (airplane); Stephans v. Commis-
sioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 39 (1976) (residence); Holland v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 611
(1974) (automobile); Rethorst v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 1101 (1972) (house); Nichols,
North, Buse Co. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1225 (1971) (yacht); Challenge Mfg. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 37 T.C. 650 (1962) (boat); Heyward v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 739 (1961) (houses), af'd,
301 F.2d 307 (4th Cir. 1962); Reynard Corp. v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 451 (1934) (house);
Frueauff v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 449 (1934) (apartment).
11. Parks v. Commissioner, 686 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1982); Baker v. Commissioner, 677 F.2d
11 (2d Cir. 1982); Commissioner v. Greenspun, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982); Beaton v. Commis-
sioner, 664 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1981); Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981); Suttle
v. Commissioner, 625 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1980); Ruwe v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1458
(1981); Trowbridge v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1302 (1981); Estate of Liechtung v. Com-
missioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 1118 (1980); Marsh v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 317 (1979); Dean v.
Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961). See generally Duhl & Fine, Interest-Free Loans and The Tax
Court: Is Dean Weakening Under IRS Attacks, 51 J. TAX'N 322 (1979); Duhl & Fine, New Case
Allowing Interest Deduction Calls for Reappraisal of No-Interest Loans, 44 J. TAX'N 34 (1976);
Jacobs, Of No Interest: Truth, Substance. and Bargain Borrowing, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 261
(1981); Livsey, Tax Aspects of Interest-Free Loans, 31 MAJOR TAX PLAN. 35 (1979); Pulliam, In-
come and Gift Tax Implications of Nonbusiness Interest-Free Loans: Looking a Gift Horse In the
Mouth, 58 TAXES 675 (1980); Roth, Can Lender Be Charged With Receiving Taxable Income As A
Result of an Interest-Free Loan, 52 J. TAX'N 136 (1980); Schlifke, Taxation as Income the Receipt
ofInterest-Free Loans, 33 U. Cm. L. REV. 346 (1965); Wilkes, Tax Court Holds Interest-Free Loan
to Shareholder Creates No Taxable Income, 14 J. TAX'N 351 (1961); Note, .R.C. § 61 and Low-
Interest Loans: Dean, Greenspun, and the Convolution Continues, 23 ARIz. L. REV. 1147 (1981);
Comment, Tax Consequences of an Interest-Free Loan, 24 Loy. L. REV. 33 (1978).
Conversely, interest-free loans between businesses create income for the borrowing corporation.
See Fitzgerald Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 508 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1975); Kerry Inv. Co. v.
Commissioner, 500 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974); Kahler Corp. v. Commissioner, 486 F.2d 1 (8th Cir.
1973); B. Forman Co. v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972);
Latham Park Manor, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 199 (1977). See also Treas. Reg. § IA82-
l(d)(4) (1962). See generally Sneed, Unlabeled Income and Section 483, 17 MAJOR TAX PLAN. 643
(1965).
The Commissioner also has argued that low interest loans constitute a gift, the value of which
equals the difference between the market rate of money and the actual interest rate of the loan
multiplied by the amount of the loan. The Commissioner's efforts have produced mixed results.
Compare Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978) (demand loan creates no taxable
gift) and Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966) (same) with Estate of Berk-
man v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 183 (1979) (term loan results in taxable gift). Seegener-
ally Edwards, Whatplanning opportunities does CA-7"s no-gift-tax holding in Crown open up?, 50 J.
TAX'N 168 (1979); Joyce & Del Cotto, Interest-Free Loans: The Odyssey of a Misnomer, 35 TAX L.
REV. 459 (1980); O'Hare, The Taxation of Interest-Free Loans, 27 VAND. L. REv. 1085 (1974);
Pulliam, supra note 11; Taylor & Schnee, Interest-Free Loans: A Needfor Caution, 58 TAXEs 263
(1980); Note, Gift Tax Implications 0/an Interest-Free Loan, 42 ALB. L. REv. 471 (1978); Note, The
Value of the Use of Money Loaned by Taxpayers to Their Children Without Interest Does Not
Constitute a Gf, 5 Hous. L. REV. 138 (1967); Note, Gft andIncome Tax Consequences of Interest-
Free Demand Loans, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 643; Comment, An Interest-Free Borrower or Lender Be:
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In Dean v. Commissioner,12 the Commissioner relied on cases hold-
ing that rent-free use of corporate property confers a taxable benefit on
the user 13 and argued that interest-free loans from a corporation to a
shareholder result in income to the shareholder. 4 The Tax Court re-
jected this argument by differentiating between rent-free use of corpo-
rate property and interest-free loans. The court examined the
dissimilar treatment of rent and interest payment deductibility, and
noted that although rent would not be deductible, borrowers of corpo-
rate funds are entitled to a full deduction for interest payments.' 5
In Greenspun v. Commissioner,'6 the Tax Court elaborated on the ra-
tionale used in its earlier Dean decision.17 The court stated that Dean
attempted to make the tax effects of a shareholder interest-free loan
identical to the tax consequences of increasing the shareholder's divi-
dends by an amount equal to the interest charges on a market-rate
Gft Tax Implications ofInterest-Free Loans, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 941 (1978); 19 STAN. L, REv. 870
(1967); 23 VILL. L. REV. 625 (1977-78).
12. 35 T.C. 1083 (1961).
13. Id at 1089. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
14. 35 T.C. at 1087.
15. ld at 1090. I.R.C. § 163(a) (1976 & Supp. 1980) allows interest payments to be deducted
from income. The deduction, however, arises only if the taxpayer itemizes deductions, I.R.C.
§ 163(d) (1976 & Supp. 1980), and the use of the borrowed funds does not generate tax-free in-
come. I.R.C. § 265(2) (1976 & Supp. 1980).
The Commissioner's efforts to tax the benefits of interest-free loans increased as interest rates
escalated. The average prime rate charged by banks rose from less than five percent in 1961 to
twelve percent in 1974. The prime rate settled to less than seven percent in 1977 before rising to
over twenty percent in 1981. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 22
BUSINESS CONDITIONS DIGE T 35 (May 1982).
The Commissioner filed his nonaquiescence to Dean in 1973. 1973-2 C.B. 4. Recently, the
Commissioner extensively pursued the interest-free loan issue at the court of appeals level. See
Parks v. Commissioner, 686 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1982); Baker v. Commissioner, 677 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.
1982); Commissioner v. Greeaspun, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982); Beaton v. Commissioner, 664
F.2d 315 (Ist Cir. 1981); Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981); Suttle v. Com-
missioner, 625 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1980).
16. 72 T.C. 931 (1979), af'd, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982).
17. Five criticisms of the Dean rule have emerged. First, allowing the free use of money to
escape taxation is inconsistent with taxing the free use of other corporate assets. See supra notes 9
& 10 and accompanying text.
Second, I.R.C. § 163(a) (1976 & Supp. 1980) authorizes interest deductions only to borrowers
who actually pay or accrue interest. Hardee v. United States, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) % 9459, at
84,658 (Ct. Cl. Tr. Div. July 6, 1982); Christensen v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 563, 577-78 (1963); D.
Loveman & Son Export Corp. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 776, 805-06 (1960), a'd, 296 F.2d 732
(6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 860 (1962); Howell Turpentine Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C.
364 (1946), rev'don other grounds sub nom Howell v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1947).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss4/9
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loan.' 8 The court conceded that in situations where interest charges are
not fully deductible,19 the Dean rule would give an unfair advantage to
the taxpayer.2" Until presented with such a case, the Greenspun court
decided to postpone modification of the Dean rule.2'
After Greenspun, courts criticized the holding of Dean,22 yet contin-
ued to follow the Dean rule that interest-free loans do not provide in-
come to shareholder-borrowers. 23 Courts refused to overturn Dean for
Interest-free borrowers pay no interest. If they recognize income they would not, therefore, as the
Dean court stated, receive an interest deduction.
Third, the interest-free borrower who recognizes income and qualifies for a deduction is in a
better after-tax situation than the market-rate borrower. See infra notes 18 & 40.
Fourth, even if the interest-free borrower recognizes income and becomes entitled to interest
deductions, other provisions might limit the deduction. See supra note 15.
Fifth, even if fully deductible, the increase in gross income might create different tax results
because gross income frequently determines the amount of other deductions. I.R.C. § 1348 (1976)
(repealed 1981) subjected different types of income to different marginal tax rates. Deductions
were allocated to the different incomes according to a ratio determined from gross income. Con-
sequently, if interest-free loan benefits increased gross income and a corresponding interest deduc-
tion was allowed, the ratio changed, the tax due on the different income changed, and, thus, the
total tax bill changed. See Jacobs, supra note 11, at 284 n.91. Similarly, gross income determines
the amount of medical and charitable deductions. See I.R.C. § 213 (1976) (medical deductions);
I.R.C. § 170 (1976 & Supp. 1980) (charitable deductions).
18. 72 T.C. at 948. The court stated:
To illustrate this point, assume that A, an employee of X Co., received as his only form
of compensation an interest free loan from X Co. in the amount of $20,000 for a period
of 1 year. Further assume the prevailing interest rate at the time was 5 percent or $1,000
a year. The economic effect of this transaction is the same as if X Co. had charged A
interest at 5 percent on the $20,000 loan, and, at the same time, paid him a salary of
$1,000 which A in turn used to pay the interest. Assuming no other facts, in the second
hypothetical, A would have gross income from his salary of $1,000 and an interest de-
duction of $1,000 or taxable income of $0. Consistent with this result, in the first hypo-
thetical involving the interest-free loan, A's taxable income under our holding in Dean
would be $0.
Id
In the two hypotheticals, A, the borrower, assumes equal tax liability. Yet, X, the lender, pays
less tax when making an interest-free loan than when making a market-rate loan, receiving inter-
est income and paying nondeductible dividends. See Jacobs, supra note I1, at 288.
In addition, the taxable income in each hypothetical is equal, but the after tax position is not.
See infra note 40. In the first situation, the interest-free loan would leave A with $1,000. The
second, because of the interest payment, would leave him with $0.
19. 72 T.C. 931, 949 n.20 (1979). See also supra note 15.
20. 72 T.C. at 949.
21. Id at 950.
22. See, e.g., Beaton v. Commissioner, 664 F.2d 315, 317 (1st Cir. 1981); Martin v. Commis-
sioner, 649 F.2d 1133, 1135 (1981) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
23. Parks v. Commissioner, 686 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1982); Baker v. Commissioner, 677 F.2d
408 (6th Cir. 1982); Commissioner v. Greenspun, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982); Beaton v. Commis-
sioner, 664 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1981); Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981); Suttle
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several reasons. First, long periods of congressional 2 and administra-
tive25 acquiescence followed the Dean decision. Second, determination
of taxable income would involve intricate measurements if interest-free
loans were held to create a taxable benefit.26 Finally, some courts con-
tend that the legislature has responsibility for taxing interest-free loans
and formulating tax policy.27 Accordingly, six circuits have held that a
shareholder does not recognize income from the interest-free use of
corporate funds.28
The Court of Claims, in Hardee v. United States,29 was the first to
adopt the Commissioner's argument that a shareholder's interest-free
loan results in income, but fails to generate an imputed interest deduc-
tion.30 Two problems with the Dean rule influenced the Hardee court's
determination. First, the Dean court's reliance on the deductibility of
interest charges to support its holding 3' was misplaced, according to the
court in Hardee.2 Criticizing the Dean court's economic equivalence
rationale33 as contrary to the Supreme Court's restrictive approach to
permitting deductions, 34 the Court of Claims stated that interest deduc-
v. Commissioner, 625 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1980); Ruwe v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1458
(1981); Trowbridge v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1302 (1981); Baker v. Commissioner, 75
T.C. 166 (1980), aj#'d, 677 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1982); Estate of Liechtung v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1118 (1980); Marsh v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 317 (1979).
24. Congress has not enacted legislation to tax the benefit of interest-free loans. Instead, in a
Senate Appropriations Committee report, it has told the Internal Revenue Service that the Com-
missioner should reduce the amount of time and money channeled into litigation of the interest-
free loan issue. S. REP. No. 955, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1980).
25. The Commissioner's nonacquiescence did not come until 1973. 1973-2 C.B. 4.
26. See, eg., Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133, 1134 (5th Cir. 1981).
27. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Greenspun, 670 F.2d 123, 126 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting United
States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 135 (1972)); Beaton v. Commissioner, 664 F.2d 315, 317 (1st Cir.
1981) (same).
28. See Parks v. Commissioner, 686 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1982); Baker v. Comissioner, 677 F.2d
11 (2d Cir. 1982); Commissioner v. Greenspun, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982); Beaton v. Commis-
sioner, 664 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1981); Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981); Suttle
v. Commissioner, 625 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1980).
29. 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9459, at 84,656 (Ct. Cl. Tr. Div. July 6, 1982).
30. Id at 84,659.
31. Id at 84,658.
32. Id at 84,659.
33. Economic equivalence is used here to mean "wash out" and not the equivalence of the
two transactions described in Greenspun, see supra note 18 and accompanying text. The terms
refer to the needless addition of income when an identical, offsetting interest deduction is present.
34. See Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating, 417 U.S. 134 (1974); Interstate
Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590 (1943); Deputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940); New
Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934). In National,41fapfa, the Court stated: "The
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss4/9
Number 4] RECENT DEVELOPMENT 1511
tions are not granted on interest-free loans because the borrower fails
to pay or accrue interest costs.35
The Court of Claims in Hardee also reasoned that the denial of an
interest deduction placed the interest-free borrower in a poorer after-
tax position than a market-rate borrower with a similar income who
gains an interest deduction.36 The court further suggested that the
Dean court overcompensated for this discrepancy by allowing the in-
terest-free borrower to escape income recognition.37 The Dean rule en-
abled the interest-free borrower to receive credit at no cost while the
market-rate borrower, although receiving an interest deduction, still in-
curred interest costs.33 Unable to ignore the inconsistencies of Dean
after separate examinations of interest deductions and income recogni-
tion, the Court of Claims rejected this economic equivalence approach
to the taxation of interest-free loans.39
In Hardee, the court incorrectly reasoned that denial of an interest
deduction placed the interest-free borrower in a worse after-tax situa-
tion than a market-rate borrower with a similar income who receives
an interest deduction. The interest-free borrower's tax liability might
be greater, but his after-tax position is clearly better.4" Because the
propriety of a deduction does not turn upon general equitable consideration, such as a demonstra-
tion of effective economic and practical equivalence." 417 U.S. at 148-49.
35. 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9459, at 84,658. The code limits deductions to those "paid or
accrued." I.R.C. § 163(a) (1976).
36. 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9459, at 84,656, 84,659.
37. Judge Wiese wrote:
Aside from the statutory impediment that the court sees in the notion of an imputed
or implicit deduction, the second problem that we have with the Dean-Greenspun analy-
sis is the result that it accomplishes: it substitutes one economic dislocation for another.
To explain: for the interest-free borrower, an obligation to recognize additional income
...coupled with the absence of an offsetting deduction, leaves that individual in a less
favorable after tax position than his counterpart, ie., the individual with income in like
amount... whose borrowing cost generates a tax deduction. Yet, under the Dean-
Greenspun analysis, the effort to eliminate this imbalance yields the equally dispropor-
tionate result of permitting the interest-free borrower to enjoy the benefit of a loan with-
out any adverse economic consequences whatsoever.
Id
38. Id
39. Id
40. Id Although the tax liability of an interest-free borrower is greater than a market-rate
borrower with a similar income, the interest-free borrower's after-tax situation is clearly better.
For example, assume that two taxpayers (I-F and M-R) have incomes of $100,000. Further as-
sume the interest-free borrower (I-F) recognizes income from compensation totaling $90,000 and
a $10,000 benefit from an interest-free loan, while the market-rate borrower (M-R) recognizes
income of $100,000 from compensation and pays $10,000 in interest charges. I-F must pay tax on
$100,000. M-R, after taking a $10,000 interest deduction pays tax on $90,000. Yet M-R pays tax
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same forum that established the Dean rule later considered the doctrine
"too sweeping," 41 the Hardee court's criticisms of Dean remain persua-
sive. The determination of the interest-free loan issue, however, de-
pend's less on the continuing validity of Dean than on the approval of
the Commissioner's use of the courts to formulate tax policy.42
Interest-free borrowers should take special notice of the Hardee deci-
sion. Until the interest-free loan issue is resolved, either by Congress or
the judiciary, the procedural aspects43 of Hardee encourage taxpayers
to petition for an income tax redetermination in the Tax Court, where
they will probably receive more favorable treatment. 44 Borrowers who
pay the deficiencies related to interest-free loans and subsequently seek
a refund may avoid the Claims Court by bringing suit in federal district
court.4 5
- B.L.7.
and interest while I-F pays only tax. Only ifl-Fs tax is greater than M-R's tax and interest will I-
F be left with fewer dollars than MR. Such a situation will occur only if the marginal tax rate on
the additional $10,000 is greater than 100%o Consequently, I-F might pay more tax, but his after-
tax situation is still better. See also supra note 1 and accompanying text.
41. See Zager v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1009, 1012 (1979), af'dsub nor. Martin v. Commis-
sioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981).
42. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
43. See supra note 3.
44. See Creel v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1173 (1979), a]f'dsub nom. Martin v. Commissioner,
649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981); Zager v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1009 (1979), af'dsub nor. Martin
v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981). See also cases cited supra note 23.
45. See supra note 3.
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